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The unprecedentedrise in the US. external deficit in the
1980s was not only the result oflarge government budget
deficits. A significant decline in the extent to which the
private saving-investment balance adjusted to finance
government budget deficits also contributed to the U.S.
external deficit. It is hypothesized that the shift in US.
monetary policy after 1979 reduced domestic financing of
us. budget deficits in the 1980s by encouraging foreign
capital inflows.
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The size and persistence of the U.S. external deficit in
recent years is unprecedented in this century, and has
promptedextensive discussion and research on its underly-
ing causes. Many observers haveargued that large govern-
ment budget deficits are primarily responsible for the U.S.
external deficits. However, external deficits depend not
only on government budget deficits, but on the private
saving-investment balance, as well. This paper discusses
the role of the private saving-investment balance in the
growth of U.S. external deficits of the 1980s.
Prior to the 1980s, the private saving-investmentbalance
varied negatively with the government budget balance,
almost fully offsetting budget deficits. Thus, until the
1980s, budget deficits largely were not associated with
externaldeficits. The extent ofthis offset decreased signifi-
cantly in the eighties, thereby increasing the impact of
budget deficits on the U.S. external position. This change
in the behavior of the private saving-investment balance
helps to explain why in the 1980sthe external deficit rose in
response to the increase in the government budget deficit.
This study argues that the change in the behavior of the
private saving-investment balance may have been caused
by the change in inflationary expectations associated with
the shift in monetary policy that took place at the end of
1979. Specifically, after 1979, the change in monetary
policy meant that higher budget deficits no longer would
cause money growth, inflation, and inflationary expecta-
tions to rise automatically, thereby increasing the willing-
ness of foreigners to finance such deficits.
The paperisorganizedasfollows. Section Idiscussesthe
behavior of budget deficits, the private saving-investment
balance, and theexternal balancebetween1960and 1987. It
reviews the findings of recent empirical and simulation
studies on the response of the private saving-investment
balance to fiscal and monetary policy and identifies certain
developments that may have changed this response over
time. Section II investigates the empirical relationship
between fiscal and monetary policy and the private saving-
investment balance, and tests for changes in this relation-
ship after 1974 and after 1980. Section III discusses some
factors that may have contributed to the change in the
response of the private saving-investment balance to fiscal
policy. Section IV summarizes the findings of this paper
and highlights some policy implications.
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nominal U.S. external deficit averaged 2.5 percentofGNP,
and peaked at 3.7 percent of GNP in the last quarter of
1987. The magnitude of the U.S. external deficit since
1982 is unprecedented in the twentieth century.
The duration of this external deficit also is unprece-
dented. Over fiveyears havepassed since the U.S. external
balance went into deficit in the third quarter of 1982. In
contrast, from the end of World War II until 1980, the U.S.
experienced external deficits for more than one quarter on
only four occasions, and the average duration was less than
a year and a half.
Chart 1also illustrates the two components of internal
balance that together equal the external balance-the
government balance and the private saving-investment
balance, both as proportions of the middle expansion trend
of GNP.3 The chart shows that during contractions, the
government balance tends to fall as tax revenues fall, and
the private saving-investment balance tends to rise as
investment declines. The reverse is true during expan-
sions."
However, the most recent economic expansion, which
began in 1982, has not been accompanied by the typical
reduction in the government deficit that has characterized
earlier expansions. Given the typical cyclical reduction in
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(S - 1)+ (T - G) = B = Net capital flow
where all variables are real and:
Y=C+I+G+B=C+S+T
I. Saving, Investment, and the External Deficit-An Overview
Internal and External Balances
To set the context for the discussion that follows, con-
sider the national income accounting identity:
Dropping C from both sides, and re-arranging yields the
following:
where the net capital flow is the difference between U.S.
investment abroad and foreign investment in the United
States.
Equation (2) describes the external balance of an econ-
omy as the sum of the saving of its private sector, or the
private saving-investment balance (the difference between
gross private saving and gross private investment), and of
its public sector, or the government budget balance. The
left hand side corresponds to the internal balance of the
economy, the right hand side to the external balance.
Equation (2) also illustrates why the external balance
maybe interpreted as the saving of the economyas a whole.
A country experiencing an external surplus is producing
more than it spends, and its saving is used to finance excess
foreign spending. Conversely, a country experiencing an
external deficit is purchasing more goods than it produces,
and foreign capital inflows finance excess domestic spend-
ing. There must be a correspondence between a country's
external balance and the balance in its capital account.
Chart 1illustrates the path of the U.S. external balance
since 1960.1The series is nominal (not adjusted for infla-
tion), and shown as a proportion of the middle expansion
trend of GNP.2 As a net exporter of capital, the U.S.
maintained a trade surplus averaging over two-fifths of a
percent of GNP up to 1980. However, the U.S. external
balance began falling sharply at the end of 1982. Between






4 EconomicReview / Fall 1988Where (T - G) and M now refer totheexogenous behavior
of the budget balance and the money supply, and 30
contains all other factors." (Note that the observed budget
balance in Chart 1 is the sum of the exogenous budget
balance and the endogenous response of the budget bal-
ance to all exogenous disturbances.) Equation (3) may be
interpreted as a reduced form. 'The underlying structure
may be motivated in terms of a standard Keynesian mac-
roeconomic model of an open economy.
Withthis framework in mind, consider firsttheeffectsof
an expansionary fiscal policy. Such a policy tends to raise
income and interest rates; the rise in income tends to
increase domestic saving, and the rise in interest rates
tends to discourage domestic investment. Consequently,
budget deficits tend to produce an offsetting rise in the
private saving-investment balance, suggesting that a, is
likely to be negative.
the private saving-investment surplus as the recovery pro-
gressed, analysts point to these budget deficits as the
primary cause of the unprecedented external deficits ob-
served to date.
But a closer examination of Chart 1also suggests that
prior to the 1980s, the private saving-investment balance
tended to vary opposite to budget deficits evenapartfrom
cyclical influences, thereby producing no discernible cy-
clical or secular trend in the trade balance until the 1980s.
'Thus a change in the behavior of the private saving-
investment balance, as well as rising budget deficits,
apparently has contributed to the external deficits of the
1980s.
'Thequestion whether external deficits in the 1980sare
the result of budgetdeficits, achange in thebehaviorof the
private saving-investment balance, and/or other factors
cannot be resolved simply by looking at the accounting
relationships embodied in Equation 2. 'These variables
respond to exogenous changes in fiscal and monetary
policy as well as to other autonomous factors. Thus, to
determine the effect of any of these variables on the
external balance of the U.S., it is important to examine
how they have behaved in response to exogenous changes
in policy. Because changes in the private saving-invest-
ment balance have received relatively less attention, this
article focuses on the implications of this relationship for
the U.S. external deficit.
Abstracting from cyclical effects, the response of the
private saving-investment balance to fiscal and monetary
policy may be expressed as follows:
s-[= ao+aJ(T - G) +a2M (3)
Anexpansionary monetary policy tends tolowerinterest
rates, stimulating investment and income. The increase in
income, in turn, stimulates saving. (In an open economy
with floating exchange rates, lower interest rates tend to
cause the currency to depreciate, stimulating net exports
and causing a further increase in income.) Since both
saving and investment tend to rise, the net impact of an
expansionary monetary policy on the private saving-
investment balance (the sign of a2) is ambiguous.
The Response of Private Saving-Investment
Equations (2) and (3) imply that it is the interaction of
fiscal and monetary policy and the private saving-invest-
ment balance that determines the external balance. 'Thus,
the magnitude of the response of the private saving-
investment balance tofiscalpolicy-thatis, themagnitude
of aI-determines whether fiscal policy affects the trade
balance. If al = - 1, fiscal deficits generally will not be
associated with external deficits; however, fiscal deficits
will be reflected in external deficits if a.> -1.6 Unfor-
tunately,the literature provides conflicting evidence on the
magnitude of a1•
Two well-known structural simulation models (Taylor,
and Sachs and Roubini), and a recent study by Benjamin
Friedman that estimates areduced form model suggest that
the private saving-investment balance does not fully offset
budget deficits (that is, a.> -1). Taylor(1987)estimates a
multi-country version of the Mundell-Fleming model?and
finds that five years after the start of a simulated cut in
government purchases "virtually all of the cut generates a
rise in[national]saving, and about 3/4ofthis rise insaving
[is reflected in] an increase in net exports."8 This suggests
thata cut in thegovernment deficit does notproduce a fully
offsetting reduction in the private saving-investment bal-
ance and is thus reflected largely in a reduction in the
external deficit.
Similarly, using a dynamic general equilibrium simula-
tion model of a six-region world economy, Sachs and
Roubini (1987) argue that the combination of sharply
higher budget deficits in the U.S. and sharply reduced
deficits in Japan goes far to explain the movements of the
external balance and exchange rates of the two econo-
mies.? Friedman's (1986) reduced-form estimates also
suggest that budget deficits largely are reflected inexternal
deficits.
Incontrast to these three studies, a well-known study by
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that national saving
(T-G+ S) was positively associated with gross private
investment (full crowding out) in across-section sample of
industrial countries. Subsequent time series analysis by
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 5Obtsfeld (1986) and Frankel (1985) found a similar posi-
tive correlation between national saving and gross private
investment in the U.S. 10 The results of the studies by
Feldstein and Horioka, Obtsfeld, and Frankel suggest that
at = -1, or close to it.
There is also no agreement on the direct impact of
changes in the money supply on the private saving-invest-
ment balance. Friedman finds that an increase in the ratio
of money to GNP increases the ratio of private saving to
GNP more than it increases the ratio of private investment
to GNP, II thus reducing the external deficit (this suggests
that az>0). In contrast, Darby, Gillingham, and Greenless
(1987) find that a rise in the real money supply in the 1980s
has tended to increase the external deficit'? through its
negativeimpacton privatesaving (that is, az<0). Similarly,
Taylor finds that in the short run, an expansionary mone-
tary policy tends to increase the external deficit, and, by
implication, to reduce the private saving-investment bal-
ance.P
Several reasons may be offered for the conflicting re-
sults, including different specifications for models, vari-
ables, and econometric methods. Omitted variables may
explain the differences in some cases and simultaneous
equations bias in others. An alternative explanation is a
change in the response of the private saving-investment
balance to fiscal and monetary policy. This possibility has
received relatively little attention, although studies re-
ported by Darby (1987) and Darby, Gillingham, and
Greenless (1987) suggest that changes in the behavior of
the private saving-investment balance may have contrib-
uted to the external deficits of the 1980s.14
A change in the relationship between the private saving-
investment balance and budget deficits might be expected,
in view of two major developments that occurred in the
1970s. First, industrial countries shifted to floating ex-
change rates'> and liberalized capital controls'< in the first
half of the 1970s. This process largely was completed by
1974, although restrictions on capital movements in the
U.K. and Japan were not removed until 1979. As discussed
more fully below, increased capital mobility and floating
exchange rates could expected to lower the offsetting
response of the private saving-investment balance to bud-
get deficits.
The second major development was the decision by the
Federal Reserve in October 1979 to change its operating
procedures for implementing monetary policy from re-
liance on an interest-rate instrument to the use of an
aggregates instrument. Dewald (1982) finds evidence that
during the earlier period, monetary tended to "ac-
commodate" fiscal policy, in the sense that there was a
positive relationship between money growth and fiscal
deficits in the U.S. In particular, the acceleration in money
growth and inflation in the 1970s appears to have been
directly related to the near tripling of fiscal deficits to over
one percent of GNP in the 1970s. 17
As a result, rising budget deficits in the 1970s may have
produced rising inflationary expectations. As discussed
below, this may have discouraged foreign capital inflows
and raised the offsetting response of the private saving-
investment balance to budget deficits in the 1970s. How-
ever, once monetary policy changed and money growth
and inflation apparently ceased to respond to budget
deficits in the 1980s, foreign capital was more likely to
flow in, thereby lowering the offsetting response of the
private saving-investment balance to budget deficits in the
1980s.
II. The Response of the Private Saving-Investment Balance
to Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Todetermine whetherthe responseofthe private saving-
investment balance to fiscal and monetary policy has
changed, regressions ofthe following form were run using
seasonally-adjusted quarterly data:
8
S I=bo+b]'(T-G)t+ l2:obz + i ' M2/- i (4)
8
+ b13 • DUM· (T-G)t + .2: b]4+i
1=0
. DUM· M2t - i + b23 • DUM· GAPt
6
where S - I is the private saving-investment balance,
T - G is the government budget balance, GNPGAP is the
gap betweenthe middleexpansiontrendof GNPand actual
GNP (a negative gap indicates a strong economy) as
defined by the Department of Commerce,18 and
is the reciprocal ofthe middle expansion trend of GNP. All
variables are scaled by the middle expansion trend of
GNP.19 The variables prefaced by DUM are slope dummy
variables, and they correspond to values ofT - G, M2, and
the GNPGAP. Significant coefficients for biZ' bl4 + i' and
b22 would indicate a change in the response of the private
saving-investment balance to fiscal policy, monetary pol-
icy, and cyclical fluctuations, respectively.
Economic Review / Fall 1988M2 was selected as the proxy for monetary policy
because of the severe instability characterizing the demand
for Ml in the 1980s. In view of possible simultaneous
equation bias, an instrumental variable was used for con-
temporaneous M2 as well as for the contemporaneous
budget balance.P? A correction for serial correlation also
was performed. 21
A regression first was run over the period 1963:3-
1979:4,22with slope dummies beginning in the first quar-
ter of 1974, to ascertain whether there was any change in
the relationship betweenthe budgetbalance and the private
saving-investment balance following the liberalization of
capital controls and the shift to floating exchange rates.
The results are reported in the first column of Table I.













a reduction in budget deficits now would reduce the U.S.
external deficit substantially, as long as the relation be-
tween the saving-investment and budget balance remains
unchanged.
The results also indicate that cyclical effects were am-
plifiedin the 1980s.Theprivate saving-investment balance
appeared to be higher in the recessions of the 1980s and
lower in the most recent expansion, which began in 1982,
than was characteristic of earlier cycles. The stronger
cyclical response is not easy to explain. It could reflect a
stronger response of investment to income (a stronger
accelerator effect) in the 1980s or the tendency for wealth
effects to reduce private saving in the current expansion.
Financial wealth has risen due totheaccumulating govern-
ment debt and the stock market boom of recent years.24
Finally, money exerts an independent influence on the
private saving-investment balance. The sum of the coeffi-
cients on M2 consistently is negative and the t-statistic on
this sum issignificantly different from zero, indicating that
an increase in the money-to-GNP ratio lowers the private
saving-investment balance-and by this channel, the ex-
ternal balance. In particular, a rise in the M2/GNP ratio
after 1982 has contributed to a lower private saving-
investment balance, and therefore has tended to increase
the external deficit.
As demonstrated in the Appendix, the significant and
positive slope dummies on M2 after 1974 are consistent
with the liberalization of capital flows in the early 1970s,
although the net effect of the positive shift is apparently
very small.P A greater degree of capital mobility will
bring about a positive shift in the response of the private
A second regression then was run over the period
1963:3-1987:4, with slope dummies beginning in the first
quarter of 1980, to examine whether the response of the
private saving-investment balance changed with the shift
in monetary policy in the last quarter of 1979 and the
further liberalization of capital controls in the U.K. and
Japan. (The slope dummies for 1974-1979 were not in-
cluded in this regression.) The results are reported in the
second column of Table I. Four and eight quarter lags on
M2 were tested in both the first and second regressions. To
select the best specification, Amemiya's prediction cri-
terion (PC) was used.P
As can be seen in Table 1, both the fiscal and monetary
policy variables are significant. The extent to which the
private saving-investment balance offsetsfiscaldeficits did
not decline following the liberalization of capital flows in
1974, but did decline after 1980. In addition, the slope
dummies on M2 are significant after 1974, but not after
1980.Toimprove the fitof the second regression, the slope
dummies for M2 after 1980 were eliminated, and the
second regression was re-run. The results are reported in
the third column of Table 1.
One potential objection to all these regressions is that
there may be a lag in the response of the private saving-
investment balance to the government budget balance as
well asto monetary policy.The regressions were therefore
re-run over the period 1963:3-1987:4, with four and eight
quarterlags on M2 and on the government budget balance,
respectively. However, in all cases, the third regression of
Table 1was superior to the alternative regressions accord-
ing to the PC criterion.
The results of the third regression inTable 1suggest that
a one point increase in the budget balance brings about a
0.88 decline in the private saving-investment balance. In
addition, the hypothesis that the private saving-investment
balance fully offset the government budget balance up to
1980 cannot be rejected. There was no change in this
relationship after 1974, and exogenous increases in the
fiscal deficit apparently did not translate into external
deficits up to the 1980s. The extent of the private saving-
investment offset weakened by nearly 50 percent after
1980, and budget deficits came to be reflected in external
deficits. Since changes in the response of the private
saving-investment balance to fiscal policy appear to ac-
count for a significant part of the deterioration of the
external balance in the 1980s, these results are interpreted
more fully in the next section.
While these results assign a major role tothe behaviorof
the private saving-investment balance in explaining the
external deficits of the 1980s, they nevertheless imply that
8 Economic Review / Fall 1988saving-investment balance to monetary policy because it
reduces the responsiveness of interest rates and investment
to changes in the money supply, and increases the respon-
siveness of exchange rates, income, and therefore, saving
to such changes.
To illustrate the implications of these results, Chart 2
compares the predicted path of the U.S. private saving-
investment balance in the 1980s using the pre- and post-
1980coefficients. Forreference, the actual path ofthe U.S.
privatesaving-investment balance also is shown. Given
the actual fiscal deficit, which averaged 3.1 percent of
GNP between 1982:4 and 1987:4, the model predicts that
the private saving-investment balance would have aver-
aged two percent, rather than the 0.7 percent actually
observed, had the pre-1980s' relationships prevailed. As a
result, the external deficit wouldhaveaveraged 1.3percent
of GNP over the period, rather than 2.5 percent.26
III. Interpreting the Results
The finding that the private saving-investment balance environment, increased capital mobility will not neces-
adjusted to fully offset changes in thebudget balanceuntil sarily diminish the response of the private saving-invest-
1980 suggests a very limited degree of net international ment balance to budget deficits. The positive correlation
capital flows, which is in line with the results of the between money growth and budget deficits in the 1970s
literature inspired by Feldstein and Horioka cited earlier. suggests that there also may have been a positive link
The absence of net international capital flows up to the between inflationary expectations and budget deficits. As
early 1970smight be explained by restrictions on interna- demonstrated more formally in the Appendix, such a link
tional capital movements, since such restrictions require has two effects that could influence the response of the
the private saving-investment balance to adjust fully to private saving-investment balance to budget deficits.
cover the financing requirements of the public sector. 27 First, an increase in inflationary expectations reduces
However, it is surprising that there was no change in the money demand and could lower real interest rates even as
relationship between the private saving-investment bal- budget deficits increase. In the standard analysis, such
ance and the budget balance after 1974(that is, the slope lower interest rates would discourage capital inflows and
dummyonthe budget balance variablewasnotpositiveand cause the dollar to depreciate. Huizinga and Mishkin
statistically significant between 1974and 1979).28 (1986) provide evidence that rising inflationary expecta-
Theory suggests that liberalization of capital flows as tions were in fact associated with falling e\" ante real
well as the shift to floating exchange rates in the early interest rates inthe 1970s.Thereal trade-weighted valueof
1970s should have reduced the offsetting response of the the dollar also depreciated almost continuously between
private saving-investment balance to fiscal policy. The 1971 and 1980.
reason is that in an open economy where capital flows As in the case of a direct increase in the money supply,
freely andexchange rates float, therise indomesticinterest however, the currency depreciation stimulates income and
rates associated with government budget deficits should saving, while the interest rate decline stimulates invest-
tend to attract foreigncapital and limit the required adjust- ment, so the net impact of excess money demand on the
ment in the domestic private saving-investment balance. private saving-investment balance must be determined
Theadjustment in theprivate saving-investmentbalance empirically.The negative coefficients for monetary policy
should be muted by capital mobility fortwo reasons. First, in the previous regression suggest that the stimulus to
foreign financing directly limits the extent to which gov- investment from an excess demand for money is stronger
ernment deficits reduce or "crowd out" investment Sec- than the stimulus to saving. Thus, the tendency for rising
ond, under floating exchange rates, capital inflows cause inflationary expectations to lower money demand appar-
the currency to appreciate. This increases the external ently does not explain why the behavior of the private
deficit, which in turn reduces the stimulus budget deficits saving-investment balance did not change in the 1970s.29
provideto income, thereby limiting therisein saving.With However, rising inflationary expectations could havean
capital mobility and floating rates, the limited response of additional effect on the behavior of the private saving-
the private saving-investment balance to budget deficits investment balance. Specifically,rising inflationaryexpec-
should ensure that the latter are reflected in external tations may increase uncertainty about the investment
deficits. environment, and thus raise the risk premium demanded
However, if budget deficits raise inflationary expecta- on U.S. dollar assets. A rise in the risk premium, in turn,
tions and thus increase uncertainty about the investment would discourage capital inflows, and cause the currency
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco 9todepreciate, even ifdomestic real interestrates donotfall.
The currency depreciation would stimulate saving, but not
investment spending in this case. Thus, a rise in the risk
premium unambiguously would raise the offsetting re-
sponse of the private saving-investment balance to budget
deficits.
This analysis suggests that if inflationary expectations
had not been rising in the 1970s, the impact of the liberal-
ization of capital controls and the shiftto floating exchange
rates on the behavior of the private saving-investment
balance would havebeen feltearlier. Instead, the impact of
the liberalizationof capital controls and the shift to floating
exchange rates was felt only after 1979, when monetary
policy changed and budget deficits no longer had the same
influence on inflationary expectations. This break in the
link between budget deficits and inflationary expectations
led to capital inflows and an appreciating currency in the
1980s, as would have been expected, given enhanced
international capital mobility.
IV. Conclusions
The unprecedented rise in the U.S. external deficit inthe
1980s mainly is the result of the interplay of two factors.
First, government deficits remained large in the expansion
of the 1980s, rather than tending towards zero as they had
during previous expansions. Second, the private saving-
investment balance failed to offset the rising budget defi-
cits as it had in the past.
The liberalization of capital movements in industrial
countries and the shift to floating exchange rates in the first
half of the 1970s had no perceptible effect on the offsetting
response of the private saving-investment balance to fiscal
policy until a major shift in monetary policy and a further
liberalization ofinternational capital movements occurred
in 1979.
This paper offers a hypothesis that is theoretically
consistentwith the timing of the changes inthe response of
the private saving-investment balance to fiscal policy. By
feeding back into inflationary expectations and increasing
uncertainty about the investment environment, the tend-
ency toward monetary accommodation of fiscal policy
until 1979 (found by Dewald) reduced the willingness of
foreigners to finance U.S.deficits and caused a continuing
10
currency depreciation which stimulated a strong offsetting
response of the private-saving investment balance to the
budget balance. This curtailed the tendency for the exter-
nal deficit to increase in response to rising budget deficits
in the 1970s, notwithstanding the liberalization of capital
restrictions and the shift to floating exchange rates in the
early 1970s. Once monetary accommodation of fiscal
policy ceased in the 1980s, the external balance deterio-
rated significantly. As the reduced-form specification used
inthis paperdoes notpermitadirect test of this hypothesis,
further research is needed.
If this interpretation is valid, the results presented here
have important policy implications. Budgetdeficits pose a
dilemma-adecline in the external balance can be averted
by accommodating budget deficits with monetary policy
and currency depreciation, but at the cost of high inflation
and greater crowding out of domestic investment. Con-
versely, policymakers can avoid high inflation and reduce
crowding out by refusing to accommodate budget deficits,
but with a rising external deficit. Thus, if efforts to reduce
the U.S. external deficit are to succeed without a re-
surgence of inflation, they must be accompanied by a
reduction in budget deficits.
Economic Review / Fall 1988APPENDIX
The domestic bond market is in equilibrium when the real
supply of domestic bonds equals the demand by domestic
and foreign residents:
where M is the real money supply, L is the demand for
money.The nominal interestrate, i, is defined as the sum of
the real interest rate and inflationary expectations:
Equation (A-I) represents equilibriuminthe goods market.
The money market equilibrium equates real money supply
to demandby domestic residents (assume foreign residents
hold no domestic money):
where ks is the supply of domestic bonds, k(.) and kf( .),
respectively, are the domestic and foreign demand for
domestic bonds, and <\> is the risk premium. It is assumed
that inflationary expectations, Il, also correspond with the
expected rate of depreciation. For similar specifications up
to this point see Dornbusch (1980) or Marston (1985).
(A-6)
(A-5) <1> = <1>(11)
+
IT = l1(T - G)
(-)
The extent to which inflationary expectations respond to
fiscal deficits will depend on the degree of monetary
accommodation to fiscal policy.
The above is a Mundell-Fleming model that allows for
imperfect asset substitutability and includes specific as-
sumptions about monetary policy and expectations forma-
tion. The following simplifying assumptions have been
made in obtaining a solution:
a. The country is small, which means that the ramifica-
tions of domestic policies on foreign income and world
interest rates are ignored. The impact of these foreign
effects on the U.S. economy apparently is small (see Sachs
and Roubini and Taylor).
b. Short-term price rigidity is assumed. Except for
specifying inflationary expectations, the dynamics of price
adjustment are not spelled out.
c. The effect of exchange rate changes on the domestic
price level is ignored. This implies that two effects of an
exchange rate appreciation are ignored in the present
analysis. These are: the improvement in the terms of trade
and real income, which tends to raise saving; and the
increase in real wealth brought about by an exchange rate
appreciation, which tends to reduce saving. Wealth effects
are important in principle, specifically in portfolio de-
mand, but they are ignored to simplify notation. This does
not affect our main conclusions.
d. The implications of a country's net creditoror debtor
position similarly are ignored. As discussedin Frenkeland
Razin (1987), if a country is a net debtor, the slopes of the
LM and IS curves may change (the LM curve may slope
downward, the IS curve becomes steeper), reversing a
number of standard conclusions. For example, a tax in-
crease may be expansionary, rather than contractionary.
Discussion of this type of model usually focuses on the
implications of capital mobility and the exchange rate
Assume further that monetary authorities respond to
changes in fiscal policy by changing the rate ofgrowth in
the money supply.* If agents are aware of this, they will
form inflationary expectations as follows:
Assume that the risk premium on dollar assets responds





+ kf(Y*.i n <1>. i*)
+ +
mcome
real domestic interest rate
domestic currency price of a unit of foreign
currency (e.g. dollars per yen)
superscript for foreign variables
superscript for holdings by foreign residents f
*





Ie' = key. i, i* n +
+ +
i = r + n
S(Y) l(r, Y) + T - G = B(E. Y. Y*)
+ + + +
The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate how the
responseofthe private balancetopolicy
may be affected by inflationary expectations, as this mech-
anism is not usually discussed in the literature. It also
shows that the direct response of the private saving-
investment balance to monetary policy is more likely to be
positive if capital mobility is high.
Rewrite equation (2) in the text as follows:
The signs refer to the partial derivatives and:
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 11regimeforthe ability offiscal and monetary policy toaffect
income. Here we will focus instead on how inflationary
expectations affect the responsiveness of the private sav-
ing-investment balance to fiscal and monetary policies.
The Solution
Substituting (6) into (3) and totally differentiating (2) to
(4), we obtain:
s+m-i,. BE -lr d,
-Ly 0 -L; dE






where s = marginal propensity to save
m = marginal propensity to import
and subscripts refer to partial derivatives.
The solution to the system is
d, - d(T - G) 0
dE I-A' LJI(T_dd(T - G) - dM
A
dr (k;*+ n + <I> -10-11-<1>)<l>nIIT_cd(T- G) 0
where:
under plausible conditions, and
o










Where, to simplify notation, the following relation is used:
<
> 0
ki* +II + <I> - ki: [J - <I> =
Inflationary expectations (reflected in the term ITC T-G))
expand income by making it more likely that the currency
will depreciate in response to fiscal deficits (that is,
dE/d(T - G)<O). Two effects are at work here. First, the
rising inflationary expectations in response to fiscal defi-
cits lower real money demand. The resulting excess de-
mand for money lowers real rates in the short run, tending
to depreciate the currency, and stimulate net exports and
income. Second, in addition to the effect of lower interest
rates, the currency depreciates furtherbecause inflationary
expectations raise the risk premium demanded by for-
eigners, thereby stimulating net exports and income even
more.
The effect of inflationary expectations on money de-
mand tends to lower real interest rates, while the effect of
inflationary expectations on the risk premiumtends to raise
real interest rates. Iftheimpact of inflationaryexpectations
on the risk premium is sufficiently strong, the currency
may depreciate even when domestic real interest rates are
not falling, or perhaps even when they are rising. In a large
economy such as the United States, it is likely that the
effects of variations in the risk premium will be reflected
largely in the exchange rate rather than in the interest rate.
The effect of an increase in the government surplus on












In the absence of international capital mobility, deS- 1)/
d(T - G) = I, because domestic saving must fully fi-
nance government deficits. However, in the presence of
capital mobility and floating exchange rates, as assumed
here, deS- I)/d(T- G) = 0 ifnC T G) = O. This is because
neither income nor interest rates will increase in response
to fiscal deficits, in the case where fiscal deficits do not
affect inflationary expectations. Thus, in the absence of
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
changes in inflationary expectations, capital mobility and
floating rates imply that the offsetting response of the
private saving-investment balance to budget deficits will
decline. The intuition is discussed in the text.
Equation (A-7) shows that if nC T G) is negative, the
response of the private saving-investment balance to fiscal
deficits will not necessarily fall to zero even with capital
mobility and floating exchange rates. The sign of the first
13right hand side term, which reflects the impact ofinflation-
ary expectations on money demand, is ambiguous;the
private saving-investment balance may rise or fall. In
contrast, the second right-hand side term (multiplied by
<Dn) is unambiguously negative. Thus, deS- I)/(T - G)
will remain negative if the second right-hand side term.is
sufficiently large.
The text argues implicitly that the response of infla-
tionary expectations, and particularly its impact on the
risk premium in the 1970s, may have risen by enough to
prevent deS- I)/d(T - G) from falling in absolute value in
the 1970s. In the 1980s, deS l)/d(T - G) fell because
II(T G) fell to zero.
In the next section, it is shown that the conditions that
determine the sign of the impact of monetary policy on the
private saving-investment balance determine the sign of
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< 0
> 0
In the text the impact of an expansionary monetary policy
on the private saving-investment balance, and therefore the
external balance, is ambiguous. Forexample, ifthe interest
sensitivity of investment demand (L) is large, an expan-
sionary monetary policy will lower the private saving-
investment balance.
An increase in capital mobility [(kj +kf
i n <1» in-
creases in absolute value] means the term (BeI~/Ll)
becomes smaller, which implies that a monetary expansion
is more likely to improve the external balance.** The
reason is that a greaterdegree of capital mobility will tend
to weaken the ability of monetary policy to influence
domestic interest rates, and therefore, investment demand
and the external balance. The finding that there was an
increase in the impact of monetary policy on the private
saving-investment balance after 1974is consistent with the
expected effect of liberalization of capital controls.
It has been assumed that an increase in the stock of
money does not directly affect inflationary expectations;
instead, expectations respond to the growth in the money
supply associated with fiscal deficits. Inspection of equa-
tions (A-7) and (A-8) also confirms that if deS- 1)/
d(T - G) in equation (A-8) is negative, as found in the
regressions in the text, the impact of inflationary expecta-
tions on money demand cannot explain why deS- 1)/
(T - G) did not fall in the 1970s.
Theeffect ofan increase in the money supply onthe private
saving-investment balance is








* See Dewald (1982), who finds evidence ofthis type ofaccommodation between 1948 and1980.
** The effect ofa tax cut may differ from that ofan increase in government spending in two ways: first, a tax cut will raise disposable
income directly as well as indirectly. Second, a tax cut may increase money demandforany levelofpretaxincome. This tends to reduce
the expansionary impact ofa tax cut on income. These effects are ignored in order to simplify the present discussion.
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1. The external balance measure used here is U.S. net
foreign investment abroad, the measure which is concep-
tually most consistent with the use of equation 2. This
measure is approximately equal to net exports of goods
and services as measured in the national income-and
product accounts.
2. The middle-expansion trend of GNP is calculated by
classifying each quarter into one of four cyclical phases:
recession, recovery, middle expansion, and late expan-
sion. The geometric mean of GNP during each middle
expansion phase provides one observation of the trend
GNP.The middle expansion begins when the level of real
GNP passes its pre-recession peak and lasts 12quarters
unless a downturn occurs before 12 quarters have pas-
sed. In the latter case, the middle expansion ends at the
cyclical peak just before the downturn. The advantage of
this approach is that it reflects the path of actual GNP
purged of cyclical movements and requires no assump-
tion about potential GNP. See De Leeuw and Holloway
(1983).
3. Thestatistical discrepancy between internal and exter-
nal balances has been added to gross private saving. It
is therefore reflected in the private saving-investment
balance.
4. The cyclical patterns disguise certain trends in these
variables and may provide a misleading picture of the
relationships among the variables. For example, the un-
adjusted U.S. government budget deficit, illustrated in
Chart 1,averaged 0.7 percent between 1976:1 and 1979:4
and turned into a surplus for a brief period. On a cyclically
adjusted basis, however, the government budget was
consistently in deficit, averaging nearly 2 percent of the
middle expansion trend of GNP. The empirical analysis
reported later controls for cyclical effects.
5. The observed budget balance, and by the accounting
identity of (2), the external balance, are also the conse-
quence of these same exogenous disturbances to fiscal
and monetary policy.
6. A coefficient for a, of -1 could mean that an expan-
sionary fiscal policy will produce a trade surplus because
such an expansionary policy will tend to create an offset-
ting improvement in the fiscal balance.
7. The model assumes perfect capital mobility and per-
fect asset substitutability. Careful attention is paid to
dynamics, and rational expectations in asset and labor
markets is assumed. Sticky wages are modelled by stag-
gered wagesetting. An earlier example of a structural
analysis of the U.S. external balance as determined by
internal balances is provided by Von Furtensberg (1980),
who examines the domestic price and quantity determi-
nants of three components of the net national saving rate
(government saving, personal saving, and corporate sav-
ing) and two components of net domestic investment
(fixed domestic investment and the rate of inventory
change). A similar approach, which focuses on interna-
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tional as well as domestic determinants, is followed by
Turner (1986)for the seven major OECD countries.
8. Taylor (1987) p. 15. Taylor performs a counterfactual
experiment in which U.S. government spending grows
less rapidly than itactually did starting inthe firstquarter of
1982, so that by 1986:1 real government purchases are
lower than they actually were by an amount equal to 3
percent of realGNP.This roughly would balance the fiscal
deficit, and result ina reduction in the outstanding stock of
government bonds.
9. The model is related to intertemporal dynamic models
of fiscal policy and solves for a full intertemporal equi-
librium in which agents have rational expectations of
future variables. Attention is given to intertemporal op-
timization and intertemporal budget constraints. In this
respect, it differs from the simple Mundell-Fleming frame-
work utilized in this paper. Obstfeld (1987) provides an
analytic (as opposed to simulation) solution to this type of
optimization problem.
10. For a study that includes developing countries see
Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson (1987). For a similar ap-
proach that treats investment as the exogenous, rather
than the endogenous variable, see Sachs (1981).
11. This is consistent with the standard trade literature,
recently summarized by Hooper and Mann (1987), who
suggest that by bringing about a currency depreciation, a
monetary expansion would tend to improve the external
balance, presumably by increasing the private saving-
investment balance as well as the budget balance. Fried-
man uses the detrended logarithm of the ratio of M1 to
GNP as the monetary policy variable.
12. They argue that four years of erratic upward move-
ments in real per capita M1, which reversed a secular
decline, contributed significantly to a decline in saving.
13. To see this, recall equation (2), S-I +T - G = B. An
expansionary monetary policy will always tend to increase
T - G, because as income rises, tax revenue increases. If
an expansionary monetary policy lowers B, it must be
because S- I has fallen. Note that given the neutrality of
money in Taylor's model, in the long-run money has no
effect on the external balance in his simulations (a2 = 0).
Sachs and Roubini also find that monetary policy isof little
importance in influencing the external balance.
14. Darby, Gillingham, and Greenless argue that the re-
duction in the U.S. national saving rate in the 1980s, and
the associated deterioration in the U.S. external balance,
were caused inlarge measure by adecline inthe personal
saving rate. Darby reports preliminary studies that find a
significant increase in investment demand inthe U.S.over
the period 1981-85. In Darby's view, such an increase in
demand permitted investment to flourish in the 1980s,
even though negative real U.S. interest rates in the 1970s
turned positive in the 1980s. Darby argues that thisup-
ward shift in investment demand was due to reductions
15in anticipated business taxes and greater confidence
that the regulatory environment would not arbitrarily turn
against business. Note, however, that the empirical ap-
proach of the present paper is closer to that of Friedman
than that of Darby et. et. The theoretical interpretation of
the results also differs from those inthe studies conducted
by Darby.
15. The U.S. shifted to floating exchange rates in March
1973.Except for a brief effort to strengthen a rapidly falling
dollar in November 1978,the behavior of exchange rates
apparently had little influence on U.S. monetary policy
from March 1973 until the Louvre agreement of February
1987.
16. Capital controls, which were widely used in OECD
countries after WorldWar II,were liberalized inthefirst half
of the 1970sfollowing the adoption of generalized floating
exchange rates and in response to the rapid growth of the
Euromarkets in the 1960s, which tended to limit the ef-
fectiveness of such controls. Capital mobility probably
had increased after the convertibility of European curren-
cies was restored in 1958,but restrictions on capital flows
largely remained effective throughout the 1960s. See
OECD (1982).
In the case of the U.S., restrictions that were designed to
prevent capital outflows largely were eliminated in Janu-
ary 1974. These were the Interest Equalization Tax (lET),
the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program, and con-
trols on direct foreign investment More stringent controls
on capital flows had been imposed from time to time inthe
1960s. For example, at the beginning of 1968, President
Johnson announced controls on outflows of capital by
American businesses, banks, and other financial institu-
tions. This included a requirement that no U.S. capital
finance direct investment inother industrial countries. This
action was taken in response to the deterioration in the
U.S. external position.
17. Dewald finds evidence that money growth was posi-
tively related to fiscal deficits between 1948and 1980.He
estimates that over the period a unit rise in the ratio of the
fiscal deficit to high employment output was associated
with a rise in the growth of M2 of 0.4 percent
18. See De Leeuw and Holloway (1983).
19. Because the variables are expressed in ratios, a
significant constant term (bo) indicates that the level (not
the ratio) of the private saving-investment balance is
related to the middle expansion trend of GNP. Further-
more, a significant coefficient on INVMETindicates that if
the relationship between the private saving-investment
balance and the budget deficit were expressed in levels
rather than ratios, the constant term would be significant
To see this, assume 8 lags on M2. Suppose the true
relationship in levels (not ratios to the middle expansion
trend of GNP) is
8
S-I=co+C1'(T-G)t+.k c2 + i ' M2t- i (5)
1=0
+ C11 . GNPGAPt + C12 ' GNPMETt
16
8
+ C13 ' DUM· (T- G), + k C14 + i
1=0
.DUM· M2t i + C23 ' DUM· GAPt
where GNPMET is the middle expansion trend of GNP.
Then the relationship expressed as ratios will be the
equation shown in the text Note that Co = b1 2and C1 2= bo
in equation (4) in the text
20. Thefirst stage regression to construct an instrumental
variable for the budget balance included the budget
balance lagged 1 to 3 quarters and contemporaneous
department of defense spending. It produced an ad-
justed R2 coefficient of .81 and a D.W statistic of 1.93,The
first stage regression for M2 included a constant, the
short-term nominal interest rate in the U,S, lagged 1 to 8
quarters and M2 lagged 1 quarter, The adjusted R-
squared was ,967, the Durbin-Watson statistic 1.4.Equa-
tion (4) in the text resembles one of the reduced form
regressions performed by Friedman (1986), However,
Friedman did not use an instrumental variables pro-
cedure,
21, The correction was implemented by running a regres-
sion with quasi-differenced data, The data were quasi-
differenced with the rho coefficient estimated from the
instrumental variables regression.
22, The sample begins in the first quarter of 1959, How-
ever, degrees of freedom were used up by various lag
lengths tried in the second stage regressions, Lagged
variables were also used in creating instrumental vari-
ables,
23, The PCcriterion isa better indicatorthan the adjusted
R-squared because it considers the losses associated
with choosing an incorrect model. It thus imposes a
higher penalty for adding variables than does Theil's
adjusted R-squared, See Judge et. el. (1985), pp 865-
866,868,
24, However, attempts to introduce a stock market vari-
able as an explanatory variable were not fruitful. The
absence of a slowdown in the economy after the stock
market decline of October 1987also suggests that wealth
effects are not very strong.
25, The marginal significance level is10percent, which is
a weak basis for not rejecting the hypothesis that there
was a shift
26. The external balance is estimated by adding the
actual government deficit and the predicted private sav-
ing-investment balance, Note that the actual government
deficit may be seen as the sum of the exogenous contem-
poraneous government deficit used on the right hand side
of the regressions and of the endogenous response of the
budget balance to fiscal and monetary policy,
27, Interms of equation (3),a, = -1 or close to it,asthere
is no foreign financing of fiscal deficits,
28, Italso should have increased the positive response of
Economic Review I Fall1988the private saving-investment balance to monetary policy,
which did occur, as there is a statistically significant and
positive slope dummy variable for M2 for 1974-79.
29. This interpretation needs to be qualified because the
regression allows for lags in the impact of the M2/GNP
ratio. Furthermore, although the demand for M2 has been
more stable than the demand for M1 in the 1980s, it is still
not perfectly stable. The rise in the M2/GNP ratio may in
some cases reflect a rise in moneydemand, particularly in
the most recent expansion.
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